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RECONCILING THE OLD THEORY 
AND THE NEW EVIDENCE 
Comments on Ronald Mann's 
'The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions' 
Jacob L Corre* 
Ronald Mann's thorough research and rigorous analysis provide 
compelling evidence that the commercial letter of credit does not fur­
ther the fundamental purpose traditionally associated with it.1 Equally 
persuasive are his hypotheses about the functions that letters of credit 
actually serve in the real world. The objective statistics are startling. 
An overwhelming majority of letter of credit seller-beneficiaries make 
at least initial presentations to issuing or correspondent banks that by 
the express terms of the letter of credit do not entitle the seller to 
payment.2 Without a waiver from its customer, the issuing bank is le­
gally entitled to, and surely will demand, strict compliance with these 
terms.3 It is only the voluntary foregoing by the buyer-applicant of its 
own unambiguous formal power, which is essentially always forth­
coming, that enables the seller to draw on the letter of credit. Thus, 
the normal course of a letter-of-credit transaction at least initially 
places the seller at the mercy of the buyer. 
Given these empirical findings, it is difficult to believe that the per­
sistent use of letters of credit in commercial transactions has anything 
to do with their theoretical potential to ensure that the seller actually 
gets paid. It is difficult to believe, but not impossible. Mann recog­
nizes that his evidence does not conclusively refute the traditional 
view that the principal function of the letter of credit is to assure pay­
ment. At least one plausible conceptual account of the letter of credit 
remains that is consistent both with the new, surprising empirics and 
the old idea that the commercial letter of credit is primarily an atomic 
element of the payment system. The traditional view does not depend 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; A.B. 1981, University of 
Chicago;J.D. 1985, Yale.-Ed. 
1. See generally Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 2494 (2000). 
2 See id. at 2502-05. 
3. See id. at 2499-501; see also U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (1999) (stating issuer's obligation to 
honor letter of credit depends on strict compliance with terms and conditions of letter of 
credit). 
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on the legal enforceability of letters of credit because one does not 
need legal rights to feel assured of payment. 
The account that I propose begins by identifying and contemplat­
ing the consequences of a likely disjunction in the locus within the firm 
(particularly the seller's firm) of the agency costs generated in the is­
suance of letters of credit, on the one hand, and in the performance of 
the conditions required before the seller is entitled to draw on the let­
ter of credit on the other. Imagine a straightforward, very large one­
time sale of a commodity by a seller who routinely does business 
around the world, and a buyer located in a country where the seller 
has little or no experience. The seller is represented by a firm-specific 
marketing representative who, lacking sufficient information about 
the buyer's reliability, demands a letter of credit. The seller wants the 
letter of credit only as a means of assuring payment. The buyer 
agrees. The terms of the letter of credit could, in theory, be worked 
out by the agents who struck the deal themselves. Alternatively, the 
parties, after agreeing on a particular issuing bank, might simply adopt 
and adapt a form of letter of credit routinely utilized by the bank; in­
deed, the bank might insist that the letter of credit be based on such a 
form. They could hand the matter over to lawyers, in or out of house, 
and the bank's lawyers will probably need to look at the resulting pa­
pers before the bank commits itself. The letter of credit that the bank 
finally issues will contain specific terms, ordinarily requiring that a 
particular set of documents evidencing shipment of the goods be pre­
sented to the bank in a particular manner within a particular time 
frame. Information as to precisely which documents must be pre­
sented to the bank, and when and how they need to get there, will be 
within the purview of any one agent or group of several agents of the 
seller, who may or may not be employees of the firm. There is no a 
priori means of determining where that information is. What the 
seller needs to do in order to get paid under the letter of credit may be 
costly to determine. 
The seller ships the goods. It is time to figure out how to draw on 
the letter of credit. Who will handle that task? Perhaps the job will go 
to an employee in the department that handled the shipping; maybe it 
will be a more specialized person in the Accounts Receivable depart­
ment. Whoever has the job of assembling the documentary evidence 
of the seller's performance will not necessarily know what the par­
ticular letter of credit requires, in terms of substance, mode of presen­
tation, or timing. In fact, it seems unlikely that the party who must as­
semble the documents that the seller will present to the issuing bank 
had anything to do with the process by which the letter of credit was 
issued. That person could search for those requirements but the 
search would be costly, both in terms of locating the source of the 
relevant information and learning the requirements. When she finds 
and learns the specific conditions, it may tum out that they require 
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conduct that is not part of the seller's standard method of complying 
with letter-of-credit conditions. That will further reduce the seller's 
share of the surplus that the sale created. 
It will surely be tempting to achieve at least some degree of stan­
dardization in the process of presenting documents to the issuing 
bank. The costs saved by doing so could well exceed the costs associ­
ated with the increased risk of the issuing bank's refusal to allow a 
draw on the letter of credit for failure to satisfy its conditions. One of 
Mann's central discoveries is that the risk of the bank not paying be­
cause the documents presented fail to conform in some respect to the 
formal terms of the letter of credit is astonishingly low. But such data 
may be consistent with the use of letters of credit primarily as a pay­
ment instrument. Even without an issuing bank's pressuring its cus­
tomer to waive the conditions, there is good reason to expect a ra­
tional buyer to waive the conditions, at least in cases where the seller 
seems to have performed the underlying contract adequately. The 
buyer would remain obligated under that underlying contract. The 
buyer would rarely refuse to waive the conditions of the letter of 
credit draw if it intended to pay for the goods. So, refusal to waive 
would ordinarily imply refusal to pay. Sometimes refusing the waiver 
would be pointless because the seller can simply resubmit documents 
that conform. The buyer will often waive even when the seller will not 
be in a position to resubmit, say, because too much time has passed. 
The buyer will assign an expected cost of refusing to pay that will be 
the sum of its expected legal liability and the expected cost of the re­
putational and other nonlegal sanctions it could suffer. If that cost is 
greater than the benefit of not paying, a rational buyer might as well 
waive. A rational and sufficiently informed seller (with a particular 
range of attitudes toward risk) who does the analysis just outlined 
might well have good reason to save the costs of conforming to the re­
quirements of particular letters of credit. 
Such a decision could be expected to occur even in one-time trans­
actions. A repeat-play relationship between the buyer and seller 
should significantly enhance the likelihood that the buyer will waive 
the letter-of-credit conditions. Part of the cost that the buyer would 
bear by refusing to waive the conditions in an ongoing relationship 
would lie in the damage to the relationship itself - a cost that obvi­
ously grows with the expected value of future dealings. As such, the 
evidence of how the parties actually behave in the typical letter-of­
credit setting, coupled with the traditional view of the letter of credit 
as principally a payment mechanism, makes the letter of credit an­
other potentially interesting case study in the important body of litera­
ture that views the formal rules of a particular contractual relationship 
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as rules to be applied in an end-game situation.4 Where the expected 
future value of a relationship approaches zero, one would expect to 
see increased opportunistic resort to strict contractual terms. Of 
course, in such circumstances the seller, perceiving that the buyer is 
more likely to refuse to waive strict application of the letter-of-credit 
terms, will place a higher value on strict conf.ormity with those terms, 
and would accordingly be more likely to incur the intrafirm agency 
costs necessary to implement strict compliance with the particular let­
ter of credit in question. It would be interesting to know whether the 
rate of compliance that one finds correlates with the length and stabil­
ity of the underlying commercial relationship. It can only be hoped 
that Mann's important study will foster the development of more so­
phisticated models that justify the continued use of the traditional let­
ter of credit, and that he will use the extensive data set that he has 
generated in preparing his current work - which he modestly calls 
"preliminary" - to test those models. 
The alternative functions of letters of credit that Mann describes 
are all consistent with the data regarding rates of initial presentation 
compliance by sellers, and of waiver by buyers. The letter of credit 
serves as a signal to the seller of the buyer's reliability because a bank 
would not vouch for an unreliable party. It also signals the legitimacy 
of the transaction itself since banks are relatively advantaged in de­
termining, or more highly motivated to determine, that the transaction 
in question is not merely a ruse to circumvent licensing requirements, 
launder money or the like. The desire for transaction verification may 
come from a seller motivated to avoid potential secondary liability for 
facilitating unlawful conduct, or directly from regulations which re­
quire that the transactions in question be implicitly verified by a suffi­
ciently reputable organization. Finally, the letter of credit also can 
minimize agency costs within the seller's firm because the agents who 
generate the sales will usually not be the ones charged with determin­
ing the firm's willingness to undertake particular classes of credit risks. 
That each of these functions commonly plays an important role in mo­
tivating the resort to letters of credit also gains support to varying de­
grees through the interviews that Mann has conducted with bank per­
sonnel active in administering letters of credit to supplement his 
objective statistics.5 
Each of these alternative explanations, tied together nicely by 
Mann's reconceptualization of the letter of credit from a payment 
mechanism to a "verification institution," clearly plays some role in 
the continued resort to letters of credit, even though they are among 
4. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Coun: Rethinking the Code's 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.1765 (1996). 
5. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 1, at 2508-09, notes accompanying text on 2517-19, 2524, 
2527-29, and notes accompanying text on 2532-36. 
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the more expensive means of ensuring payment. The present study 
does not purport to inquire into or offer any evidence of the relative 
frequency with which each of these functions plays a significant role in 
the generation of a letter of credit. However, this reorientation of the 
theoretical foundations of the letter of credit has identifiable and sig­
nificant implications for the agenda of future empirical research. The 
findings already obtained probably contain strong indicia of the rela­
tive significance of the different verification functions identified. 
The degree to which each of the three verification functions Mann 
has identified motivates the use of a letter of credit ought to correlate 
significantly with the transactors' decision to continue utilizing the let­
ter of credit over the course of a sustained relationship. Consider the 
first verification function: the letter of credit is an instrument by 
which a bank, as the party that can at the lowest cost obtain informa­
tion regarding the buyer's creditworthiness, signals the seller that the 
risk of the buyer's default is acceptably low. Such information will be 
important early in a relationship because the seller has no personal in­
formation about the buyer. Over the course of a relationship solidi­
fied by iterated success in individuated transactions, the seller does 
gain its own specific information about the buyer. The buyer's will­
ingness to waive deviations between the seller's documentary presen­
tations and the express terms of the particular letter of credit may ac­
tually hasten the process by which the seller comes to trust the buyer. 
With or without such opportunities for a buyer to signal its willingness 
to cooperate, the marginal utility of the bank's signal about the buyer 
should begin to decrease more or less quickly. At some point the 
marginal increase in the seller's expected gain from the transaction at­
tributable to the bank's signal about the buyer's reliability will be in­
sufficient to justify the cost of the continued deployment of the letter 
of credit. At that point one would expect to see the parties shift from 
reliance on a letter of credit to a cheaper method of bonding the 
buyer's performance, such as a documentary collection transaction. 
The "transaction verification" function presents a more compli­
cated picture. Insofar as the need for verifying the authenticity of a 
sale comes from the seller concerned with either nonpayment or sec­
ondary liability, it can be expected to follow more or less the same 
course as the "vouching for the buyer" function. After enough good 
sales, the seller will be confident enough in the buyer's reliability that 
the increase in comfort that a letter of credit delivers won't be worth 
the price. But if the letter of credit instead serves to assure a regula­
tory authority that the sale is real, it is unlikely that the demand for 
such assurance will be particularly sensitive to the length or stability of 
a particular relationship. The optimal precision in the applicable 
regulation is likely to be based on the nature of the transaction rather 
than the history of dealings between particular parties, a factor that 
would significantly increase the regulator's cost of determining 
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whether a particular transaction falls within the scope of the regula­
tion. Accordingly, the use of the letter of credit would persist over the 
entire course of even the most successful relationship. 
The need for intrafirm verification will perhaps also decline over 
the course of a repeat-play relationship. Trust can mollify the need for 
costly constraints on transactional form aimed at constraining risk 
taking to the appropriate level in an organizational hierarchy in much 
the same way as general reputation can. Imagine a rule within a 
seller's firm that transactions over a certain amount require a letter of 
credit. Such a rule could be expected to give more discretion to low­
level agents dealing with longstanding customers. It would be just as 
rational to design such a rule as it would to require a lower level of 
approval to sell to Microsoft or General Motors on open credit than to 
offer the same terms to an e-business start-up company. A firm gov­
erned by this rule would resort to letters of credit less in repeat .. play 
relationships. Mann's subjective empirical work with bank officers 
confirms this phenomenon. 
Mann's groundbreaking article demarcates several new paths for 
both theoretical and empirical research. These paths point to a deeper 
understanding of areas beyond the basic commercial letter of credit. 
The letter of credit is a form of agreement that may be regulated by 
local law, the Uniform Commercial Code, or by international conven­
tion, the Uniform Customs and Practice. Mann's article suggests that 
there may be significant variations between letter-of-credit practices in 
domestic and international transactions. How extensive are these dif­
ferences and can they be conceptually correlated with differences in 
the underlying legal regimes? The letter of credit thus seems to offer 
an excellent opportunity for studying the effect of background alloca­
tions of right - "the shadow of the law" - on actual commercial 
practices. Mann's article also has implications for the investigation of 
transactional forms related to the straight letter of credit in a basic 
sales transaction. Given that one basic function of the letter of credit 
is to sever the source of the obligation to pay from the actual practice 
of payment, whether or not it operates primarily as a payment mecha­
nism, studying the choice of a letter of credit over a secondary obliga­
tion such as the standby letter of credit promises a good chance to 
verify and expand on important recent work in the legal and economic 
foundations of the guarantee contract.6 Mann's data and his analysis 
both make possible and demand a number of promising lines of future 
research. 
6. See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 47 (1999). 
